In the second part of his article on Syria, first published on Syria Untold, Joseph Daher looks at how events are unfolding since the fall of the Assad regime. He examines the nature of the new ruling HTS, its attempts to consolidate power, alliances with local states, reliance on neoliberal policies and its clamping down on the rights of ethnic minorities and women. A mass movement from below, he argues, is urgently needed to defend democracy and bring real change.
As discussed in part one, remnants of the ancient regime, particularly from the security services and military, are a definite threat to the stability of Syria in the short term. They need to be stopped and judged for their crimes.
However, and while not underestimating threats represented by these groups of individuals, they do not constitute a threat in the form of returning to power and reimposing a dictatorship. They do not have the political, military and economic means to achieve such an objective. It is important to understand the nature of Assad’s regime and the difference with the Egyptian scenario. While the ancient regime in Syria is structurally dead, reflected by the disappearance of the Presidential Palace and its networks, in Egypt the centres of power within the military high command have remained in control, despite the fall of Mubarak in 2011 and the rule of Morsi between July 2012 and July 2013.
Understanding these dynamics is also important to warn of the accusations of “feloul”, or remnants of the ancient regime, led by some commentators and media close to the new ruling actor, HTS, against anyone criticizing or demonstrating against it. This is a way to discredit individuals and groups and their political demands. Similarly, accusations of feloul were raised against a demonstration for a democratic and secular state in Damascus a few weeks ago, because several individuals were accused, sometimes wrongly, of being supporters of the ancient regime. Regardless of the presence of several individuals potentially supporters of the former regime among thousands and more of protesters, the real objective was to discredit the demonstration and the demands connected to it. Moreover, there is a willingness to characterize some issues such as secularism and socialism as connected with the ancient regime and/or a western import to discredit them.
Indeed, this connects to the second part of the article. Again, if groups of individuals of the ancient regime are a threat to the country’s stability, a great threat for a democratic and progressive Syria lies in the consolidation of power of HTS and its affiliate, the SNA, that is supported by Turkey and Qatar.
HTS’s consolidation of power
The leading role of HTS in the military offensive resulting in the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 has brought huge popularity to the organisation and its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (Al-Julani). They have benefited since then from a form of “revolutionary” legitimacy, which is being used to consolidate its rule politically and militarily in the regions under HTS domination.
After the fall of the regime, Ahmed al-Sharaa initially met with former Prime Minister Mohammed al-Jalali to coordinate the transition of power, before appointing Mohammad al-Bashir as head of the transitional government responsible for handling current affairs. Al-Bashir had previously headed the Salvation Government (SG). He will hold office in any case until 1 March 2025. The new government is composed solely of individuals from the ranks of HTS or close to it.
Ahmed al-Sharaa has also appointed new ministers, security figures and governors for various regions affiliated with HTS or armed groups of the SNA close to it. For example, Anas Khattab (also known as Abu Ahmad Houdoud) was appointed head of the intelligence services. He is a founding member of Jabhat al-Nusra and was the jihadist group’s number one security referent. As of 2017, he governed HTS’s internal affairs and security policy. Following his appointment, he announced the restructuring of the security services under his authority.
In the recomposition of the Syrian army, the HTS government also seeks to consolidate its control over the country’s fragmented armed groups by prohibiting any other actor from carrying weapons outside of state control, and that the Syrian Defence and Interior Ministries are the only two parties that are allowed to possess weapons. While the unification of all armed groups into a new Syrian army is not opposed per se, there is still however opposition from large sectors of the Druze community in Suwayda and the Kurds in the Northeast, without some guarantees, such as decentralization and a real democratic process of transition.
In one of his recent interviews, Ahmed al-Sharaa also declared that the organization of future elections could take as long as four years and the drafting of a new constitution up to three years. At the same time, a “Syrian National Dialogue Conference”, gathering 1,200 figures was initially planned for the 4 and 5 January 2025 but was delayed to an unknown future date. No information has been given on how these personalities have been selected, except that each governorate will be represented by between 70 and 100 figures, taking into account all segments from different social and scientific classes with representatives of youth and women.
Syrian lawyers recently launched a petition calling for free union elections after the new authorities appointed an unelected union council.
HTS seeks to consolidate its power while carrying out a controlled transition by also seeking to allay foreign fears, establish contacts with regional and international powers, and be recognized as a legitimate force with which it is possible to negotiate. One obstacle to such normalization is the fact that HTS is still considered a terrorist organization by the United States, Turkey, the United Nations, while Syria is still under sanctions. Moreover, as part of the National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, US President Joe Biden signed on 23 December the extension of the application of the Caesar Act until 31 December 2029, despite the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime. Signed into law five years earlier by former President Donald Trump, this text provides for sanctions on all actors – including foreigners – who help the Syrian regime acquire resources or technologies that strengthen its military activities or contribute to the reconstruction of Syria.
While the group has evolved politically and ideologically, abandoning its transnational jihadist objectives to become an actor seeking to operate within the Syrian national framework, this does not mean that HTS has become an actor supporting a democratic society and promoting equality and social justice, quite the opposite.
But elements in favour of a change in the orientation of regional and international capitals towards HTS are already visible. Clearly, Ankara is the main political and military supporter of the new Syria, while Qatar will play a major role as an economic pillar. At the same time, al-Sharaa is working to build relationships with other Arab states, regional and international actors. For example, the HTS leader met with a Saudi delegation in Damascus and praised the Saudi kingdom’s ambitious development plans, in reference to its Vision 2030 project, and expressed optimism about future collaboration between Damascus and Riyadh. For Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf monarchies, the evolution of relations with the new Syrian leaders will depend on their ability to address their concerns about the political nature of the country and prevent Syria from becoming another source of regional instability. A Syrian delegation visited the Saudi Kingdom, composed notably of the Foreign Minister, Defence Minister, and head of the intelligence services.
Even at the level of Western powers, a change of direction is noticeable, including from the United States. The head of the Middle East in American diplomacy, Barbara Leaf, after meeting with Ahmed al-Sharaa in Damascus in late December 2024, said they had a “good, very productive and detailed meeting” on the future of the political transition in this country. She also called Ahmed al-Sharaa “a pragmatic man,” announcing that Washington was withdrawing the $10 million bounty on his head that had been on the books since 2013 for his role in Jabhat al-Nusra.
The recent statements made by al-Sharaa of a dissolution of HTS could also resolve some of these problems.
Israel is still, however, a threat to the stability of Syria, and is especially not keen to see a democratization process. Following the overthrow of the Assad regime, which has guaranteed stability to Israel at its borders, the Israeli occupation army expanded its occupation of Syrian lands by invading the Syrian part of Mount Hermon, in the Golan Heights and carried out over 480 strikes on anti-aircraft batteries, military airfields, weapons production sites, combat aircraft and missiles. Missile vessels struck the Syrian naval facilities of Al-Bayda port and Latakia port where 15 Syrian naval vessels were docked. These raids aim to destroy Syria’s military capabilities to prevent them being used against Israel. It is also sending the message that the Israeli occupation army can cause political instability at any time, should the future government adopt a hostile position that doesn’t serve Israel’s interests.
Islamic Neoliberalism
Following the fall of Assad’s regime, Syria’s future is filled with many challenges, particularly regarding its economic recovery and re-development. Already, the cost of reconstruction is estimated to range between $250 billion and $400 billion, and sanctions still constitute an obstacle to things improving any time soon.
The absence of a secure and stable economic situation in Syria is a severe obstacle to boosting local and foreign investment. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has indeed remained limited and mostly restricted to Iran and Russia since 2011. Whilst the Gulf could be interested in making some investments in the country to increase its influence, the role that HTS is currently playing may be an obstacle to this as it is perceived negatively by numerous regional states.
The UAE diplomatic adviser to president Sheikh Mohamed, Anwar Gargash, for instance stated that “the nature of the new forces in power and their affiliations with the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda are quite worrying indicators”.
Furthermore, the instability of the Syrian pound is a significant issue. While in the aftermath of the fall of the regime its value on the black market massively increased, before stabilising at 15,000 SYP for a USD, there is a long way to go. The lack of stability of the SYP erodes the attractiveness of potential rapid and medium-term returns and profits on investments in the country.
Moreover, there are questions regarding the regions in the northwest that have been using the Turkish lira for several years now, in order to stabilise markets damaged by the severe depreciation of the SYP. To reinstate the Syrian pound as the main currency in those areas could be problematic if no stability is achieved.
At the same time, infrastructures and transport networks are severely damaged. The high cost of production, shortages of key commodities and energy resources (particularly fuel oil and electricity) are additional problems. Syria also suffers from a shortage of qualified manpower, and it is not yet clear whether those who hold the skills will return.
Even the private sector, which is mostly composed of small and medium scale enterprises with limited capacities, still requires much modernisation and rebuilding after more than 13 years of war. State resources are also severely restricted which also limits investments in the economy, particularly in the productive sectors.
Additionally, 90% of the population is living under the poverty line, which makes their purchasing power very weak, and therefore negatively impacts internal consumption. Because whilst Syria is not short of jobs, people are not paid enough to meet their daily needs. In this context, Syrians have been depending more and more on remittances to survive.
Some officials of the new government, like Ahmed al-Sharaa himself, announced that they would be working to raise workers’ wages by 400% in the coming days. While this is a step in the right direction, this wouldn’t be adequate for people to cover their needs during the continuing cost of living crisis.
On top of all of this, the influence of foreign powers in Syria is still a source of threat and instability, as Israel’s latest invasion and continuous destruction of military infrastructures has demonstrated. Not forgetting Turkey’s constant attacks and threats to the north east of Syria, particularly in Kurdish majority inhabited areas.
One of the biggest issues amidst the sea of uncertainty in the country, is the lack of an alternative political-economic program amongst the majority of leading political actors, including HTS.
HTS has no alternative to the neoliberal economic system, and similar to the dynamics and forms of crony capitalism that existed under the previous regime, the group is enthusiastic about developing these practices amongst business networks (comprising old and new figures). In previous years, the SG, has favoured the development of the private sector, and close business associates to HTS and al-Julani.
According to Bassel Hamwi, the president of the Damascus Chamber of Commerce, HTS told business leaders that they would adopt a free-market model and integrate the country into the global economy.
Leader al-Sharaa and his Minister of Economy have also held numerous meetings with representatives of these economic chambers and businessmen from different regions to explain their economic visions and listen to their grievances in order to satisfy their interests. The large majority of the representatives of various economic chambers of the old regime still occupy their positions.
Ultimately, this neoliberal economic system mixed with HTS’ authoritarianism will likely lead to socio-economic inequalities and continued impoverishment of the Syrian population, which were some of the main reasons for the 2011 uprising. Meanwhile, most of the social services – particularly health and education – were provided by NGOs and International NGOs.
The new Minister of Economy affiliated with HTS reiterated this neoliberal orientation a few days after saying that “we will move from a socialist economy…to a free market economy respecting Islamic laws”. Regardless of the complete fallacy of describing the previous regime as socialist, the class orientation of the minister was clearly reflected in the emphasis that “the private sector… will be an effective partner and contributor to building the Syrian economy”.
No mention was made of workers, peasants, public state employees, or of any trade unions and professional associations in the country’s future economy.
Ultimately, the process of reconstruction is connected to the social and political forces that will participate in the future of the country, and the balance of power between them. In this context, the construction of autonomous and mass trade union organisations will be essential to improve the living and working conditions of the population and more generally to fight for democratic rights and an economic system based on social justice and equality.
Reactionary ideology
Similarly, HTS has made several statements and decisions confirming its reactionary ideology.
Particularly, HTS officials have gone on record about the role of women in society, including regarding their ability to work in some sectors. For instance, in an interview on 16 December, Obeida Arnaout, HTS member and spokesman for Political Affairs of Command of Military Operations (CMO), stated that women’s “roles must align with what women can perform. For instance, if we say that a woman should be Minister of Defence, does this align with her nature and biological makeup? Undoubtedly, it does not”.
A few days later, Aisha al-Dibs, Syria’s newly appointed head of Women’s Affairs and the only woman so far in Syria’s transitional government, responded to a question about the “space” that would be given to feminist organisations in the country that if the “actions of such organisations support the model that we are going to build, then they will be welcome“, adding: “I am not going to open the path for those who don’t agree with my thinking.” She continued the interview developing a reactionary vision of the role of women in society by urging women “not to go beyond the priorities of their God-given nature” and to know “their educational role in the family”.
In addition to this, Syrian Ministry of Education has made changes to the school curriculum towards a more Islamic conservative vision, including the removal of the theory of evolution from the science curriculum. Jews and Christians are now referred to as those who have “gone astray” from the true path and references to “defending the nation” have been replaced with “defending Allah.” After much criticism of these changes, the Minister of Education announced the next day that “the curricula in all Syrian schools remain as they are until specialized committees are formed to review and audit the curricula. We have only directed the deletion of what glorifies the defunct Assad regime, and we have adopted images of the Syrian revolution flag instead of the flag of the defunct regime in all school books…” Thus, some of the changes that had been made were cancelled.
It is therefore not enough to make unclear statements on the tolerance of religious or ethnic minorities or on respect of women’s rights. The key issue is recognizing their rights as equal citizens participating in deciding the future of the country. More generally, HTS officials have clearly stated their preference for an Islamic governance and the implementation of the Sharia Law.
No solution for the Kurdish issue
It is unlikely that HTS is willing to support the demands of the SDF and AANES, particularly concerning Kurdish national rights. After all, the northeastern regions are rich in natural resources, especially oil and agriculture, and so are strategically and symbolically important. Ultimately, HTS is no different to the Syrian National Council and the National Coalition of Opposition and Revolutionary Forces – opposition actors in exile who are hostile to Kurdish national rights.
Turkey has become the most important regional actor in the country, following the fall of the Assad regime. By providing support for HTS, Ankara has been consolidating its power over Syria. Turkey’s main objective, other than carrying out forced returns of Syrian refugees and benefiting from future economic opportunities during the reconstruction phase, is to deny Kurdish aspirations for autonomy, and more specifically undermine the AANES. This would set a precedent for Kurdish self-determination in Turkey.
Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan declared during a joint press conference with HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, that the territorial integrity of Syria is “non-negotiable” and that the PKK “has no place” in the country. A few days later, president Erdogan declared that the SDF “will either bid farewell to their weapons, or they will be buried in Syrian lands”. The Turkish army has also continuously bombed civilians and critical infrastructures of the north east of Syria since the end of 2023.
While HTS hasn’t participated in any military confrontations against the SDF in recent weeks, the organisation hasn’t vocalised opposition to Turkish-led attacks – quite the opposite. Murhaf Abu Qasra, a top commander of the HTS and the newly nominated Defence Minister of the transitional government, stated that “Syria will not be divided and there will be no federalism inshallah. God willing, all these areas will be under Syria[n authority]”. Similarly, al-Sharaa opposes federalism.
Moreover, al-Sharaa told a Turkish newspaper that Syria would develop a strategic relationship with Turkey going forward, and added that: “We do not accept that Syrian lands threaten and destabilise Turkey or other places”. He also stated that all weapons must come under state control, including those in the SDF-held areas.
This is all despite SDF officials making statements seeking negotiations with HTS. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi declared they’re in favour of state decentralisation and self-administration, but not federalism, whilst being open to being part of a future Syrian national army (with guarantees). He declared that the SDF are not an extension of the PKK and are ready to expel non-Syrian fighters immediately after reaching a truce.
Al-Sharaa stated in the past few days that they were negotiating with the SDF to resolve the crisis in northeastern Syria and that the Syrian Ministry of Defence will integrate Kurdish forces into its ranks. But it remains to be seen how this would be done and with what conditions.
A race against time to defend a democratic space
The vast majority of democratic social organizations and forces that were at the origin of the Syrian popular uprising in March 2011 were bloodily repressed: first and foremost by the Syrian regime, but also by various armed Islamic fundamentalist organizations. The same was true for local alternative political institutions or entities set up by the demonstrators, such as coordination committees and local councils that provided services to the local population.
Nevertheless, some civil groups and networks do exist, although they are mostly linked to NGO-type organizations throughout Syrian territory, and particularly in northwestern Syria, and they have different dynamics from those established at the beginning of the uprising.
At the same time, other experiences of struggle have developed, even if of lesser intensity. For example, popular protests and strikes have been ongoing in Suwayda governorate, populated mainly by the Druze minority, since mid-August 2023. More broadly, the protest movement has continually stressed the importance of Syrian unity, the release of political prisoners, and social justice, while demanding the implementation of UN Resolution 2254, which calls for a political transition. It is actually the local networks and groups that recently selected long-time activist Muhsina al-Mahithawi to be the governor of the Suwayda province.
Other cities and regions under the control of the Syrian regime, notably the governorates of Daraa and to a lesser extent the suburbs of Damascus, have also been the site of occasional protests, although on a much smaller scale.
These forms of dissent partly laid the foundation for their uprising in the days before the fall of the Assad dynasty.
More generally, the experience accumulated during the early years of the beginning of the popular uprising, which was the most dynamic in terms of popular civil resistance, has been preserved by the transmission of the activists who lived these experiences and by the unprecedented documentation of the uprising, including writings, video recordings, testimonies and other evidence. This vast documentary archive on the civil resistance movement can be transmitted to popular memory and build a crucial resource for those who resist in the future.
Following the end of the Assad regime, local initiatives have been multiplying to establish forms of local committees or networks of activists throughout different regions to encourage self-organisation, participation from below and guarantee civil peace. Demonstrations have already occurred, notably to denounce particular reactionary statements made against women.
This said, we have to face the hard fact that there is a glaring absence of an independent democratic and progressive bloc that is able to organize and clearly oppose the new ruling actor. Building this bloc will take time. It will have to combine struggles against autocracy, exploitation, and all forms of oppression. It will need to raise demands for democracy, equality, Kurdish self-determination, and women’s liberation in order to build solidarity among the country’s exploited and oppressed.
To advance such demands, that progressive bloc will have to build and rebuild popular organizations from unions to feminist organizations, community organizations, and national structures to bring them together. That will require collaboration between democratic and progressive actors throughout society.
In addition to this, one of the key tasks will be to tackle the country’s central ethnic division, the one between Arabs and Kurds. Progressive forces must wage a clear struggle against Arab chauvinism to overcome this division and forge solidarity between these populations. This has been a challenge from the start of the Syrian revolution in 2011 and will have to be confronted and resolved in a progressive manner in order for the country’s people to be truly liberated.
Rebuild struggles from below
It is important to remember that HTS is more the result of the counter-revolution led by the Syrian regime, which bloodily suppressed the popular uprising and its democratic organizations, and has increasingly militarized itself. The rise of this type of Islamic fundamentalist movements is the result of various reasons, including the initial facilitation of their expansion by the regime, the repression of the protest movement leading to the radicalization of some elements, better organization and discipline of its groups, and finally the support of foreign countries.
Subsequently, HTS, like other armed Islamic fundamentalist organizations, has in many ways constituted the second wing of the counter-revolution after the Assad regime. Their vision of society and the future of Syria is in opposition to the initial objectives of the uprising and its inclusive message of democracy, social justice and equality. Their ideology, political program and practices have proven violent not only against regime forces, but also against democratic and progressive groups, both civilian and armed, ethnic and religious minorities and women.
In conclusion, to preserve and struggle for a democratic and progressive society is not through trusting the current HTS authorities, nor of giving them good grades on its governance and the management of its transitional phase, but by building an independent counter-power gathering democratic and progressive networks and associations. The timeframe to organise elections and write a new constitution, or the selection of figures in “a national dialogue conference”, can be subjects for debates and criticisms, but the core issue is the absence of participation from below in the process of such decision making and the inability to pressure HTS to make concessions. The decision making is only in the hands of HTS. This process is also supported by its main backers Turkey and Qatar, but more generally the large majority of regional and international powers. More generally, they have a common objective in (re-)imposing a form of authoritarian stability in Syria and the region. That, of course, does not mean unity between the regional and imperial powers. They each have their own, and often antagonistic, interests, but they do not want the destabilization of the Middle East and North Africa.
The hope for a better future is in the air following Assad’s downfall. This is all connected to Syrians’ ability to rebuild struggles from below. Currently, HTS power and control over society is still not complete, as their human and military capacities are still limited to rule fully over the whole of Syria, and therefore some space exists to organize. This needs to be exploited.
In the end, only the self-organisation of popular classes fighting for democratic and progressive demands will pave the path towards actual liberation and emancipation.
At least now, the opportunity for this exists but we are in a race and Syrian popular classes have to organize to defend all the sacrifices made to achieve the initial aspirations of the Revolution for democracy, social justice and equality
